By:  Justin B. Lee, University of Montana 

This essay deals with the concepts of cultural relativism as apposed to current notions of universal human rights and the roll of western cultural anthropologists in non-western countries. It asserts that anthropological interposition of western values is a from of western imperialism. Accept in a limited range of circumstances it is unethical for cultural anthropologists to impose their personal values in these cultures.

Cultural relativism, human rights, cultural anthropology

In this age of political correctness in America the ever troubling question of cultural relativism is confronting anthropologists to a greater degree than ever before. Anthropologists today are being asked, by elements both inside and outside the discipline, to review their role in the furtherance of universal human rights in national and international foreign policy. As a young anthropologist in America today I have found it very difficult to navigate in one atmosphere which demands I be neutral, bias free (to the extent I am able), and not ethnocentric while at the same time satisfying the requirements of my personal values and those of the culture in which I am primarily involved.

My American culture demands the ideal concepts of universal egalitarianism, freedom, and a broad spectrum of human rights. Modern liberal movements disparage me if I do not only hold these beliefs as my personal code of ethic; but also if I do not work to further these concepts in my world to the greatest degree I can.

On the other hand, I am a cultural anthropologist. As such I am continually asked to view cultures foreign to me. My methodology demands that in order to do this effectively, I must follow a critical set of basic rules. The first is that I be culturally impartial. To the extent that I am able I must try to observe cultures from a completely neutral stand point. I must not be ethnocentric. I can not make personal value statements about whether I believe a culture to be involved in good or bad practices. It is widely accepted in my discipline that to knowingly violate this rule would be to seriously harm the quality and professionalism of my work. My profession demands that I be a cultural relativist.

The dichotomy inherent between these two worlds is the subject of this paper. I must admit at the onset that I favor the idea of strict cultural relativity. It is under this epistemology that I have had the greatest deal of professional training and therefore I tend to lean in its direction. I will take explicit issue with the popular concepts of universal human right, universal harm, and natural law in this paper. I will discuss what I see as the great danger of espousing values cross-culturally. However, though I will be approaching these concepts from a conservative view in the application of anthropology, I also hope to encourage a newly defined role for the discipline in working with the cultures of the world.

Cultural Relativism

One of the basic corner stones in anthropology has been the concept of cultural relativity. According to Barrnett (1996:21) it is, "[T]he time-honored way in which anthropologist have attempted to avoid ethnocentrism...It is generally assumed that there are no good or bad cultures or cultural practices." Barrnett (1996:21) distinguished the idea of "amoral relativism" from cultural relativism which would dictate that any activity can be justified "under the guise of culture..."

I want to make it clear that this paper is not advocating the use of culture as a loophole for knowingly practicing behavior inconsistent with ones own cultural norms and values. Barrnett's definition states that the act of placing value (of any kind) on culture is wrong. However, it preempts individuals from engaging in behavior they know to be morally wrong and justifying this action though cultural relativity.

A deeper articulation of cultural relativity is presented by Hammond (1964:482):

"In naive form, cultural relativism asserts that all people, all cultures, are equally good: if they are cannibals, well, that's not for me, but de gustibus....In more sophisticated form it asserts that each culture must be valued in its own terms: does it satisfy the people themselves? If they are cannibals, what satisfaction does eating human flesh supply in terms of native values? There is much to be said for this point of view; the evaluation of infanticide in the Arctic or the eating of grubs by the Arunta cannot be judged through the love we feel toward our children or by our culinary predilections. For this is judgment of good versus bad, and the good is defined in terms of conditioning that each of us has had, in terms of our own cultural values".

However, Donnelly (1993:36) mainly promotes a concept he calls "weak relativism." By weak relativism Donnelly (1993:36) means, "Human rights are held to be largely universal, subject only to secondary cultural modifications." This is to say that there exists a standard of conduct (generalized in documents that he calls the "Universal Declaration and the Covenants" which all humans must follow (Donnelly 1993: 36).

Donnelly specifies this code by stating:

For example, it is difficult to imagine defensible arguments in the contemporary world to deny rights to life, liberty, security of person, or protection against slavery, arbitrary arrest, radical discrimination, and torture (Donnelly 1993: 36-37).

It is obvious that there is a great deal of difference between Barrnett's definition of cultural relativity and that of Donnelly's. In fact upon close examination it becomes clear that they contradict one another. The remainder of this paper is dedicated to the discussion of this contradiction.

Westernism

The word westernism is one I have used often and with little certainty as to exactly what it means. The definition of westernism is, "a word, idiom, or practice characteristic of people of the Occident [American and European Nations]" (Random House Unabridged Dictionary).

Donnelly's general list of universal human rights is distinctively western in nature. His articulation of the specific activities that the advocates of human rights would disallow smack suspiciously of something which might have been read during formulation of the Magna Charta or Bill of Rights (very western documents) and would indeed be consistent with the previous definition of westernism. A wonderful example of this is Donnelly's (1993: 37) assertion that the right of "political participation" is the "right to vote in open and fair elections." This is advocacy of democratic ideals and there really is no better example of a western concept. It appears that many advocates of universal human rights make no attempt to conceal the fact that these values are explicitly western in nature.

Therefore, even at this short distance into the argument, we have at least established that the idea of universal human rights is not universal at all and should rather be called western human rights. However, as the authors (who I will be critiqueing) use the statement universal human rights in promoting their goal we, for the sake of consistency and to avoid confusion, will also use this terminology. This does not take away from the fact that universal human rights should be more accurately termed western human rights.

Universal Human Rights and Universal Harm

Recently I read an article by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban entitled, Negotiating the Terrain Between Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Right. This article is an excellent example of an attempt to legitimize the idea that there is a higher law all people are required, simply by the fact that they are alive, to follow. Additionally, this higher law included the idea of universal human rights and establishes further that there is a universal concept of harm. Fluehr's attempt to establish this principle allows her to justify her stance as a cultural relativist (which, as an anthropologist, she should be) and a universal human rights advocate (which the political correctness of the day demands of her.)

Fluehr's, however, is unsuccessful in her arguments on at least two important axioms. The first is that she believes a concept she calls "universal harm" is cross- culturally or universally extant in all societies. The second, and closely related error on which her arguments are based, is the principle of "natural law."

She defines harm as "death, pain, disability, loss of freedom or pleasure that results from an act by one human upon another" (Fluehr 1996: 4). This definition closely mirrors Donnelly's general list of human rights. In fact, they are used interchangeably. She vindicates this premise by comparing it to the "ethics of harm" used by "traditions outside anthropology" namely "medical and biological research...[,] federal regulations regulating research in the behavioral sciences...[, and] philosophy" (Fluehr 1996: 4). Of course, these examples of other disciplines are all western in origin.

Fluehr (1996:4) advocates that anthropologists can go into a culture, free of bias, and record all the elements of that cultural with a clear mind. Then after this is over delineate what practices are right and wrong. She has no problem with diversity tolerance as long as it applies to "styles of music and dance...or kinship systems" (Fluehr 1996: 4). However, when her values conflict with another culture, in this so called realm of "universal harm", she advocates giving "serious consideration" to "taking a stand against it" (Fluehr 1996: 4).

While I agree that there are clear definitions, in every culture, of harm, I can not agree nor does Fluehr show a clear existence of a universal meaning for harm. Her definition of harm is limited by its Western origin. The problem is that while it is easy to say that all cultures will recognize harm in some form, specific activities which are considered harmful vary to a great degree.

For example we could compare the idea of harm to the presents of a family structure in every culture. We call the family a cultural universal (Harris 1995: 16). This is to say that every culture has some type of family unit. However, we would be hard pressed to show a universal practice or set of family rules to which all cultures conform. In fact we know that families around the world vary in every degree possible making it futile to tie the concept of family to any firm criteria of practice or meaning other than a very broad definition such as "a social group characterized by common residence, economic cooperation, and reproduction" (Stephens 1963: 1). However, even definitions this broad are subject to assault (Stephens 1963: 12-18).

The concept of harm is no different. Every culture recognizes harm to the cultural unit or members of the culture in some way. But the practice and the meaning of harm is vastly different across cultural lines. Therefore, any attempt to standardize the concept of harm is not only impossible but also ethnocentric and heavily laden with cultural bias.

Consider some culturally specific examples. The Yonomamo who inhabit the rain forests of northern Brazil and southern Venezuela are known to be a very fierce people. Not only are the men of this culture well known for their bravery and ferocity in battle, they are also famous for they domestic fighting and this behavior is carried out not only among men of a band but also toward wives. Napoleon Chagnon (1992:124), who wrote the definitive work on the Yonomamo, comments on the tradition of wife beating within this culture:

Women must respond quickly to the demands of their husbands and even anticipate their needs...Should the wife be slow at doing this, some irate husbands scold them or even beat them...Most physical reprimands meted out take the form of blows with the hand or with a piece of fire wood, but a good many husbands are more severe. Some of them chop their wives with the sharp edge of a machete or ax or shoot them with a barbed arrow in some non-vital area...

Now this treatment of women in American culture (while existent in many cases) is repulsive to most men and women alike. Most likely an American women who's husband had just chopped her with a machete would not only divorce him but also see that she landed him in jail. The interesting cross cultural comparison between American women and the Yonomamo women is that Yonomamo woman consider some of this treatment by their husbands as a sign that they are important to them. While the pain of this bereavement initially is ominous, the pain of feeling that she is not wanted by her husband is worse. Chagnon (1992:125) states:

Women who are not too severely treated might measure their husband's concern in terms of the frequency of minor physical reprimands they sustain. I overhead two young women discussing each other's scalp scars. One of them commented that the other's husband must really care for her since he has beaten her on the head so frequently.

There is restrictions on wife beating in Yonomamo culture, however. If a wife is being beaten too badly and her husband is considered to be cruel, then her brother has the right to take her away and give her to a nicer man (Chagnon 1992:125).

The point of this example is that the Yonomamo do recognize the concept of harm as established by the cases that a brother might repossess his sister from a cruel husband. However, the degree and meaning of harm among Yonomamo and Americans, for example, is qualitatively different.

It would seem, by her definition of harm, that Fluehr would suggest that harm had taken place the minute a Yonomamo husband slapped his wife even though neither the husband or the wife would think that a harm had been committed. Fluehr is clearly opposed to wife beating and therefore would advocate "standing up against" this activity in Yonomamo culture. Yet I believe that interference in this culture is ethnocentric and could in the end create more dangerous harm to the culture than originally anticipated. Examples of this will be discussed at a later portion of this paper.

This is only one in a vast number of cross-cultural examples which prove that harm, in practice, is thought of differently based on differing cultural settings and many of these practices assault Western value systems. Genital mutilation is a hot issue right now which I think could fit into this category. However, who are we to project our values on any of these activities and what could be the effect of this intrusion upon other cultures? Policy which advocates this parallels dangerously the ethnocentric and vastly more dangerous tactics of missionization, colonialism, and imperialism which I will discuss later.

Natural Law

For thousands of years the idea of a higher law or natural law has been discussed and Fluehr uses this concept in her justification of anthropological advocacy in the area of human rights. She writes:

"Human rights are often discussed as being a priori, a given, a fact of being born and being human, in the realm of natural law. While lawyers may look askance at the notion of basic rights derived from natural law, anthropologists could embrace and refine Kluckhohn's idea that morality is as universal as language and revive research of cross-cultural systems of morals and ethics as a means of enlightening international human rights discourse" (Fluehr 1996: 03).

However, critics of natural law have, historically, made the point quite effectively that the notion is conspicuously vague. Additionally, many people including Fluehr tend to misunderstand the classical theory of natural law.

A standard definition of Natural Law is, "a principle or body of laws considered as derived from nature, right reason, or religion as ethically binding in human society" (Random House Unabridged Dictionary).

A more advanced definition of the concept is:

...a system or rules and principles for the guidance of human conduct which, independently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar to any one people, might be discovered by the rational intelligence of man, and would be found to grow out of and conforming to his nature, meaning by that word his whole mental, moral, and physical constitution (Blacks Law Dictionary 1990: 1026).

...a life ordered 'according to nature' which in turn rested upon the purely suppositions existence, in primitive times, of a 'state of nature'; that is a condition of society in which men universally were governed solely by rational and consistent obedience to the needs, impulses, and prompting of their true nature...(Blacks Law Dictionary 1990: 1026).

Traditionally, natural law is misused in the context that there exists one higher law to which all humans must conform. Rather, the philosophy of natural law never indicates that it obligates all humans in conforming to one specific code of behavior. Further, it is ludicrous to think that all humans could use the same reasoning in establishing their own natural laws. Reasoning is based on what we are cultural taught. Our cultures vary to high degrees because of the vast environmental differences experienced around the world (cultural ecology) (Harris, White, Steward). For Fluehr to adequately promote the existence of a universal morality would mean that she is disregarding the much of the theory we use to explain how culture is formed.

In order to promote the theory that one universal law could be applied for the governance of every culture or that universal laws could be promulgated cross- culturally is to totally disregard many major theoretical concepts in anthropology as viable methods in understanding cultural evolution and development. If in fact one purports to use natural law cross-culturally, one also has to completely redefine the way culture develops and propose a new theory which must include as one of its base tenant that the environment is not a casual agent in this process. If one should make this case, then they would be rewriting anthropology as we know it today.

For Fluehr's arguments to be factual then we would have to prove that all people share the same views of morality and the same value systems. It does not take a minute of anthropological training to see that this is simply not the case. I am a firm advocate of the concept of cultural ecology and on this concept alone Fluehr's arguments can be disproven. It is well established that the environment plays a considerable role in the cultivation of cultural values. If one accepts this idea then one must recognize that environments around the world are different in every respect imaginable. Because they are, every society has the propensity to be different in how they view their world and how they assign they own particular value structures. These values then dictate what an individual or a society thinks of as reasonable activities.

However, it is really inconsequential what theoretical concept or groups of concepts are use to describe the way culture form: all of them, that I know of (with maybe the exception of the very tenuous "world systems theory" developed by scholars such as Wallerstien and Wolf) end up showing you that most cultures evolve differently and are endowed with vastly differing values (Sanderson 1991: 167). There can be no basis then to say now, because groups in the west think all people should use Western values in the treatment of other people, all people are obligated to the same set of universal moral constraints.

This is not to say that I think there is no room in anthropology to reinvent much of our traditional ways of thinking. Quite the contrary, I believe anthropology must be open to revolutionary ideas and must continually question the status quo. However, for Fluehr to suggest that such a broad idea as universal natural law exists is challenging the basic core of the discipline. Further, she makes no attempt to qualify her statements by showing that all humans could have the same natural law guiding their behavior.

Ebenstein's (1991: 402-403) discussion of Hobbes' view on nature law sums it up the best:

"Hobbes' hostility to natural law, whether based on good reason or religious faith, is not only linked to his conception of sovereignty and government, but is closely related to his total rejection of values and universally valid ethical ideas...This emotive theory of value, as the modern philosophical school of logical positivism calls it, thus denies to statements of value any objective validity or meaning, since such statements merely tell us something about the feelings of a person with respect to some actions, but say nothing meaningful or valid about the actions themselves".

"But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calls good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderate. For these words of good and evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that uses them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves" (Ebenstein 1991: 403).

The Consequences of Enforcing Universal (Western) Values

Fluehr (1996: 4) resists the idea that promotion of human rights in anthropology is not synonymous with the elevation of Western ideas over other ideas. Yet she makes no attempt to explain why. She makes the statement:

This reception of western ideas concerning human rights is not in the same ideological league as colonialist or imperialist paradigms that sought to evaluate difference and rank western as superior and non- western as inferior (Fluehr 1996: 4).

With this statement I hardily disagree. What Fluehr suggests is nothing short of politically correct, western missonization and can be directly correlated to the efforts of many religious institutions and governments, through the years, in the interest of saving the poor savages of the world.

However, seeking to better the lives of non-western people by promoting western values in they cultures is not a new idea. In fact, this idea is really no different than Lubbock's (the British archaeologist [1843-1913]) assertion that Western civilization needed to be introduced into the affairs of the "primitives" in order to encourage their advancement toward civilization. In an article written by Trigger (1989: 116), he states Lubbock's view of "primitives" which supposedly bolstered his argument that they need to be saved:

"He maintained that they were more deficient in moral sense [emphasis added] than was generally believed and took pains to document how specific groups regularly mistreated children, murdered aged parents, ate human flesh, and practiced human sacrifice. To demonstrate their lack of routine Victorian values, he also emphasized their dirtiness".

"His [Lubbock's] views of native peoples justified British colonization and the establishment of political and economic controls abroad on the grounds that they promoted the general progress of the human species. He also absolved British and American settlers of much of the moral responsibility for the rapid decline of native peoples in North America, Australia, and the Pacific".

We need only look at Americans own indigenous people to see that the devastating results of having their cultures swept away from them and being handed a newer, presumably better, set of values. In fact, in a paper written by Jorgenson (1982: 266), he articulates that Indians because of acculturation are now "underdeveloped:"

Underdevelopment, in my view, has been caused by the development of the white-controlled national economy, and the political, economic, and social conditions of Indians are not improving because the American Indian is, and has been for over one hundred years, fully integrated into the national political economy. Underdevelopment, paradoxically then, has been caused by the development of capitalist political economy of the United States. This postulate is in direct opposition to the postulate that seems to underlie acculturation, and also suggests a basic contradiction in the American political economy.

There are many examples around the world of people being totally disenfranchised though the incorporation of Western values into their cultures. I believe that the work of universal human rights advocates has these same dangers. If it was damaging then (and in many cases a policy that completely failed) I see not clear reason to suspect the same results would not repeat themselves.

Those who would change value structures and practices in various cultures should also consider the psychological and social trauma that they, in many cases, inflict on these groups. This concept is stated eloquently by Weiss (1988: 126):

"And for those voluntary migrants [those people outside the culture wishing to change it] there is always the possibility of returning the embrace of the culture they left. It is something else when human beings, as parts of a large cultural system, survive the destruction of that cultural system, still imbued with the understandings and feeling proper to that lost system and with no real place for themselves in the cultural system that destroyed theirs. The incomprehension, the demoralization, the despondency, the hopelessness-this condition might even be judged worse than death. It is the condition we observe in cases in which tribal people have survived the destruction of their tribal cultures".

Is Westernism Really "Better?"

One of the issue which seems never to enter the discussion in the debate over incorporation of the world into the paradigms of western values is the question; is westernism better? Westerners tend to look out into the world of human existence which a degree of narcissism at cultures we view as less developed. However, a close look at Western society leads to many questions over just how well our values have worked. From that perspective who is to say that we are better off?

In America alone we see example every day and in a broad spectrum of ways that our way of life; of interacting with one another; our culture leaves very much to be desired. Our young people are growing up unparented, our quality of life is very good if you live in the ever diminishing portion of society which has all the assets. Women, after years of struggle are not yet equal in our society. Our minorities still suffer from the bitter existence of racism and waste away in property. Who are we to lift ourselves up as the model everyone should follow?

In a recent interview on National Public Radio, Robert Bly, (the internationally known author, poet, and social critic) cited many examples of the ways Westernisum has failed as a viable social experience and organization. Bly spoke of new Nigerian pro western policies that disallow the ancient manhood rights of passage. He sites as a result now the radically increasing present of gang made up of young man roaming the streets in search of what he calls "their manhood" (National Public Radio: 11-25- 96).

Bly used the example of Native Americans and the diminishment of their right of passage traditions for both men and women. In many cases, he showed how the U.S. government's successful destruction of these traits has left young people with no identity.

And while these all seem to be interesting and rather clear examples, one has only to look at the streets of America to see that we are defiantly not the icon of social order and utopia. The social problems of America are grossly overlooked by a society to blinded by ethnocentrism to see that rather than being a successful social experiment, we are a severely unstable, ticking, time bomb.

From this vantage point it seems almost unethical to ask cultures to incorporate western ideals into their system of beliefs. I disagree that we are an effective model in many respects. Further, I wonder if we would not be better off doing away with many of our paradigms and using those of other cultures. We could benefit from some of this activity. At least the process of introspection would be helpful for us.

Can Anthropology Play a Role the International Debate Over Human Rights?

The difficult question is then proposed to anthropologists today: Should we have a role in international discourse? The answer is "Yes!" I agree with Fluehr's assertion that anthropology must play a far greater roll in the development of both national domestic policy and international foreign policy. I shutter to think of the many incidents which could have been avoided had anthropologists informed the prevailing policy of the time. However, I insist that anthropologists in these situation must continue to be true cultural relativist and not only when political correctness and personal value biases give them permission.

In addition, anthropologist must take heed of the mistakes we have made in the past and work to learn from them. Ruth Landman (1978: 221) writes;

"One of the ways to enhance the role of Anthropology for the future is to learn important lessons from the anthropological past. In this way, we may be able to gain insights which were not easily arrived at in earlier times, and thereby perhaps, to approach future tasks more lucidly".

Anthropology is vastly underepresented in the circles which make up world policy. It makes no sense that when dealing with foreign culture, the experts are not consulted. As a discipline we must push to be included in this capacity. Not only would this effort work to legitimize the profession but we could have a hand in seeing that the many and historical mistakes of policy makers are not repeated.

And what of these troubling cultural issues that even insult the personal values of the most seasoned western anthropologists? How must we deal with this issues? I believe that we deal with them through both tolerance and education. Modern human rights theorists have missed the point of their own dogma. Intolerance of intolerance is still intolerance. As anthropologists in the twenty first century, we must work in all cultures under a banner of tolerance while educating people as to the idiosyncrasies of other cultures. Cultures change themselves if they see a benefit in doing so. However, they must have the information. We must be the catalyst though which both western and non-western ideas flow. In this manner cultures may see some benefits cross- culturally and, perhaps, thereby seek to change themselves.

Summary

In sum this paper has first established that the notion of universal human rights is not universal at all but rather the specific personal values of people who are western in origin. Therefore, the arguments that they articulate for the presents of a universal code of morality can be discredited on this fact alone seeing that they are biased by their own values.

Second: This paper has shown that the concept of universal harm is too convoluted to be an applicable theory. The convolution is created by the fact that most cultures view the definition of harm differently. Therefore, the establishment of a universal meaning for harm is impossible.

Third: This paper rejects the interpretation of natural law by both Fluehr and Donnelly. Natural law is not universal in that is obliges all people to follow one specific set of rules. Rather, natural law is based on the individuals own sense of reason; what they personally find to be good and bad in the world. Further, the argument has been made that because all cultures develop differently due to differing environmental restraints, it is not possible to expect that all people would share a homogenous sense of reason. Therefore, use of natural law in an attempt to justify universal reality is logically bankrupt.

Fourth: This paper establishes the fact that ethnocentric thinking, no matter how noble its roots, in one particular society, has been and is damaging and dangerous to other societies. Values systems are not readily exchangeable. What has been good for westerners has not always been good for others and there is really no reason to believe that western values will be beneficial to these cultures.

Fifth: The discussion of ethnocentrism has been brought home by asking the question, "Does westernsm work?" In many ways it was pointed out that, while we think of ourselves as the great social experiment which will go down in history as an overwhelming success, this is empirically not the case. In fact questions can be easily forwarded which ask if we really are better off that other cultures we tend to look down upon. It is unethical then to wish that others be like us, seeing that we are really not that great?

Finally, The role of the anthropologist today has been addressed. Cultural relativity does not preempt anthropologists from being involved with national and international policy making. In fact, anthropology should inform this policy. The discipline has too long stood on the outside and not joined into this type of discourse. There exists great potential for becoming involved to a much greater extent in these activities in the future. Doing so would benefit not only the policy being created but also the internal evolution of the discipline itself.

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Justin Lee is a second year graduate student, in cultural anthropology, at the University of Montana - Missoula. He graduated from the Western Montana College with a BA in Liberal Sciences and plans to attend law school in the fall of 1998. Mr. Lee has conducted ethnographic work concerning community value systems and land use issues in Montana. He is currently writing his masters thesis on land use and ownership issues related to Native American Reservations. Mr. Lee is currently involved as a consultant in the anti-trust litigation against the United States Government on behalf of the Inter-Tribal Monitoring Association. Additionally, Mr. Lee is working with the Blackfeet Reservation Development Fund, Inc. on Native American economic development issues.

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